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A
t present, both EU and 
domestic competition law 
apply to anticompetitive 
behaviour taking place 
within the UK.  The influence of 
the EU law prohibitions on the 
development of the distinct domestic 
rules has been significant: from the 
ground-breaking Competition Act 
1980, which introduced effects-
based competition law in the UK; to 
the revitalised Competition Act 1998 
(CA98), which replicates the EU rules 
within domestic law; to the ambitious 
Consumer Rights Act 2015, which 
sought to position the UK as a global 
centre for private enforcement in line 
with evolving EU trends.  The wider 
impact within the UK legal landscape 
has been more unpredictable but no 
less notable: from the infamous ‘euro-
defence,’ which arose in the context 
of private law; to broader economic 
changes such as liberalisation of the 
Scottish water industry to coincide 
with adoption of CA98.
Post-Brexit much depends, in this 
field as in others, on the Article 50 
negotiation process and the nature 
of any deal ultimately agreed. In the 
now unlikely  event that the UK 
retains access to the internal market 
through participation in the European 
Economic Area (EEA), there would 
be comparatively little change, as the 
substance of the EU competition rules 
is replicated within the EEA Agreement. 
Enforcement of these provisions lies 
with the European Commission and 
EFTA Surveillance Authority, while 
there would be little need to amend 
the corresponding domestic rules. 
Alternatively, the mythic ‘bespoke 
deal’ sought by the UK Government 
might contain obligations to apply 
EU competition law or equivalent 
provisions, a commitment that would 
arguably be less contentious than, for 
instance, ceding ground on immigration 
controls. But let’s assume instead that 
EU or EEA competition law will have no 
place post-Brexit: what will this mean 
for competition law and policy?
The likely effects have two principal 
dimensions: first, in terms of the non-
applicability of the EU competition rules 
within the UK jurisdiction; and second, 
in terms of potential knock-on effects 
for existing—and persisting—domestic 
law. We will examine these dimensions 
with respect to four key areas of 
competition law and policy: antitrust, 
merger control, State aid, and public 
procurement. 
Antitrust law
A nt i t ru s t— the  ru l e s  gove rn ing 
anticompetitive coordination under 
Article 101 TFEU and Chapter I of the 
CA98, and abuse of dominance under 
Article 102 TFEU and Chapter II of the 
CA98—is an area where we could 
potentially see significant changes. 
Most obviously, Articles 101 and 102 
would cease to have application in 
respect of anticompetitive behaviour 
taking place in the UK. The Commission 
would similarly lose its enforcement 
jurisdiction, including its power of pre-
emption over the UK’s Competition 
and Markets Authority (CMA) under 
‘Modernisation’ Regulation 1/2003. 
On the other hand, UK companies 
will remain within the jurisdiction 
of EU competition law to the extent 
that anticompetit ive behaviour is 
implemented or (more controversially) 
takes effect within the EU. The CMA, 
for its part, would no longer have any 
obligation to apply Articles 101 or 102 
in domestic cases with a potential effect 
on trade between Member States, as 
currently required by Regulation 1/2003. 
It would also lose its membership of the 
European Competition Network, 
w h i c h  f u n c t i o n s  a s  a — l a r g e l y 
successful—coordination mechanism 
to facilitate more effective enforcement 
amongst the 28 national competition 
authorities and the Commission.
The potential effects extend beyond the 
EU realm. Currently, UK competition law 
is interpreted and applied in a manner 
intended to ensure, in the wording 
of section 60 CA98, that there is ‘no 
inconsistency’ between the domestic 
rules and EU law, encompassing both 
the case-law of the Court of Justice and 
the Commission’s decisional practice. 
Post-Brexit, this provision would appear 
to have little purpose, and thus presents 
a likely candidate for repeal under the 
supplementary powers envisaged 
within ‘Great Repeal Bill’. Ending 
the direct legal connection between 
EU and UK competition law is unlikely, 
however, to be the end of the story. 
First, the Chapters I and II prohibitions 
are clearly modelled on their EU law 
equivalents, so that EU precedents will 
continue to have marked relevance in 
this context, even if no longer legally 
binding. Moreover, in the past couple 
of decades EU law has emerged as 
one of the leading intellectual forces 
within the increasingly global field of 
competition law, and thus might be 
viewed as an example of ‘best practice’ 
here. Accordingly, it is unlikely that UK 
competition law will depart radically 
from its path over the past decade or 
so, or from the general tenor of the 
equivalent EU rules.  
Competition Law and 
Policy after Brexit
Competition law and policy is an area where the EU legal 
framework has had a particularly significant impact on the 
evolution of UK law. The EU rules have functioned as both catalyst 
and model for the equivalent UK provisions, while the broader 
influence of EU competition law extends considerably beyond 
the confines of the field itself. This contribution reviews the likely 
impact of Brexit, following which UK competition law faces the 
prospect of being cut adrift from its foundational influences.
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Yet is  cer tainly possible that,  on 
discrete issues, UK law may develop 
in  a  manner  e i ther  more or  les s 
expansive than EU law. An example of 
the former might include extending 
the scope of UK competition law to 
behaviour outside the purview of the 
EU rules. A possibility is the application 
of competition law to activities of the 
NHS, something precluded to a large 
extent within EU competition law, 
yet embraced by the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in the early case 
of BetterCare, and implicit within 
the (highly contentious) Health 
and Social Care Act 2012. The 
desirability of doing so, of course, is 
less obvious. Alternatively, UK courts or 
the CMA may decline to follow certain 
EU antitrust precedents, arguably a 
distinct possibility in areas where EU 
law has received criticism for undue 
formalism or ‘uneconomic’ approaches. 
A High Court case from earlier this year 
in Asda v MasterCard presents an 
intriguing teaser of this possibility. Here, 
Mr Justice Popplewell declined to follow 
the approach of the Commission in its 
earlier MasterCard decision, holding 
instead that the same behaviour on 
slightly different facts did not breach 
either Article 101 or the Chapter I 
prohibition.  
This decision also points to an area 
where the UK is l ikely to lose out 
s ignif icantly post-Brex it:  namely, 
private damages actions for antitrust 
infringements. The Commission has, 
for over a decade, sought to develop 
a ‘competition culture’ in the EU 
bolstered by robust private enforcement, 
culminating in the passage of a Directive 
on Antitrust Damages Actions in 2014 
to strengthen national enforcement 
procedures. Prior to Brexit, the UK had 
been positioning itself to develop as the 
preeminent centre for such activity in 
the EU. The Consumer Rights Act 2015, 
in particular, expanded the jurisdiction 
of the CAT, and introduced various 
procedural innovations such as opt-
out class action suits. While Brexit does 
not entirely rule out the possibility that 
such actions may continue to come 
before UK courts, it is likely to diminish 
signif icantly the gains that might 
otherwise have been available to the 
UK’s legal community.
Merger control
In terms of merger control, the wide 
definition of transactions having a 
‘Union dimension’ under the EU Merger 
Control Regulation (EUMR) means that 
mergers involving large UK firms will, 
in many instances, continue to require 
notification to the Commission. Loss of 
the ‘one-stop-shop’ facility, however, 
will mean that such transactions must 
also be notified to and reviewed by the 
CMA, thus increasing costs and risks 
for businesses. Any implications for 
the substantive merger control rules in 
the UK are unlikely to be substantial, 
however. As things currently stand, UK 
law already differs, at least formally, 
in terms of the standard of review 
deployed—a ‘substantial lessening of 
competition’ test, in contrast to the 
EUMR's ‘substantial impediment to 
effective competition" criterion—yet 
both regimes are sophisticated and 
well-regarded in terms of the substance 
of analysis. The only pressing question 
post-Brexit is, perhaps, whether UK 
merger control might be refashioned to 
pursue a more robust industrial policy to 
shape the UK economy in its brave new 
world outside the internal market. This, 
however, seems both unlikely and, many 
would argue, highly undesirable should 
it materialise.
State aid
This nonetheless brings us to the 
question of the broader competition 
policy framework for the UK post-
Brexit, and specifically, the issue of State 
support to foster industrial development 
or avert economic decline. At present, 
the UK's ability to provide financial 
support to individual firms is limited by 
the State aid rules, which prohibit such 
funding unless justified by reference to 
a relatively narrow range of economic 
or social concerns. The State aid rules 
have been criticised, in particular, by 
commentators and politicians on the 
left who advocate for a more proactive 
role for government within industry. 
Yet as the claimed ‘sweetheart 
deal’ granted to Nissan in the wake 
of the Brexit vote illustrates, granting 
financial or other support to strategically 
important private-sector players is not 
an exclusively left-wing concern.
Leaving the EU is thus likely to allow 
the UK Government greater flexibility 
in this regard—although, in a ‘chicken-
and-egg’ s ituat ion, the potential 
negative economic impact of Brexit 
is likely to be a key motivation for 
any more interventionist economic 
policy facilitated by removal of the 
constraint of the State aid rules. In the 
longer term, however, significant State 
intervention to prop up otherwise 
failing industries is unlikely to prove 
either sustainable or effective. Nor does 
it seem compatible with conventional 
Tory wisdom which has, for many 
decades, focused on ‘rolling back the 
frontier of the State’. Finally, as the UK 
attempts to build its regrettably titled 
Empire 2.0 going forward, it must 
bear in mind the limitations imposed by 
WTO law, which, although less exacting 
than the State aid rules, nonetheless 
impose certain constraints on subsidies. 
On a slightly facetious note, abandoning 
the State aid rules would, however, at 
least remove one potential obstacle 
to the rather graceless suggestion that 
the UK might become a ‘tax haven’ 
should the Article 50 negotiations fail 
to deliver a sufficiently advantageous 
outcome. 
Public procurement
Public procurement, too, is an area 
where EU law currently provides the 
bedrock of the decidedly complex UK 
legal framework. It is unlikely that 
Brexit will result in significant changes 
to the underly ing procedures for 
procurement in the short term, and it 
is practically unthinkable that it might 
lead to the wholesale abandonment 
of procurement regulation even in the 
longer term. Where we are more likely 
see change is in terms of the equality 
of access currently guaranteed to 
traders from other Member States, 
reflecting the fact that the public 
procurement rules are an application 
of the principles of free movement 
and non-discrimination from EU law. 
A more selective approach might thus 
allow the task of procurement to be 
used more strategically as a tool of 
industrial policy, again shaping industrial 
deve lopment  in  the  pos t- B rex i t 
landscape. On the other hand, it may 
be doubted whether the apparently 
inexorable commitment to ‘value 
for money’ in public procurement 
would actually be sacrificed to satisfy 
more nationalist ic urges .  I t 
i s  wor th not ing,  moreover,  that 
the WTO framework also contains 
relevant restr ic t ions in the shape 
of the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, to which the UK is 
currently a party as EU Member State.
Perhaps the most interesting challenges 
posed by Brexit, however, arise not 
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for the Member State that intends 
to leave but rather for the 27 that 
remain. Although somewhat late 
to the party in terms of substantive 
competition law, the UK has had 
significant influence over the tenor 
of economic development within the 
internal market. Indeed, many of the 
so-called ‘neoliberal’ phenomena 
associated with the EU—including 
market- opening,  deregulat ion, 
corporatisation and even privatisation 
of public enterprises—were first 
conce ived of  and implemented 
domestically within the UK. The 
dissatisfaction in certain Member 
States with the undue emphasis placed 
on the ‘economic’ in preference to 
the ‘social’ in Europe is well-known, 
culminating in a side-lining of any 
reference to ‘undistorted competition’ 
in the Lisbon Treaty at the insistence 
of France’s Nicolas Sarkozy. 
The UK’s departure thus removes a 
significant liberalising force from the 
EU structure. As the UK embraces a 
future of free trade tempered by more 
local industrial policy concerns, within 
the reconstituted EU the question 
is whether we might see a rather 
different, perhaps more interventionist 
kind of competition policy emerging in 
future.  
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